Intrusion Detection System Resiliency to Byzantine Attacks: The Case Study of Wormholes in OLSR
Baras, John, S.
Date: October 29 - October 31, 2007
In this paper, we extend the work presented in  by quantifying the effects of in-band wormhole attacks on Intrusion Detection Systems. More specifically, we propose a mathematical framework for obtaining performance bounds of Byzantine attackers and the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in terms of detection delay. We formulate the problem of distributed collaborative defense against coordinated attacks in MANET as a dynamic game problem. In our formulation, we have on the one hand a group of attackers that observe what is going on in the network and coordinate their attack in an adaptive manner. On the other side, we have a group of defending nodes (the IDS nodes) that collaboratively observe the network and coordinate their actions against the attackers. Using extensions of the game theoretic framework of  we provide a mathematical framework for efficient identification of the worst attacks and damages that the attackers can achieve, as well as the best response of the defenders. This approach leads to quantifying resiliency of the routing-attack IDS with respect to Byzantine attacks.